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Abstract 
In this paper we assess the effectiveness of large scale bailouts aiming at preventing a 
financial crisis from further propagating into a systemic risk. We examine the 
structural changes in the relationship between the sovereign and financial institutions’ 
credit default swap spreads during the European sovereign debt crisis. Before the first 
Greek bailout by the EFSF, the sovereign and financial sectors exhibit a two-way 
feedback effect for both the short and the long runs. Crucially, we find that after the 
first Greek bailout, shocks in the financial sector either exert significantly negative 
impacts or lose influences on the sovereign sector. In contrast, all the later bailouts by 
the EFSF (the second Greek bailout, Irish and Portugal bailouts) do not show this 
pattern change in the two-way risk transfer relationship.  
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1. Introduction 
The unsustainable Greek sovereign debt came to a brink of imminent default in early 
2010. Propagated by the Eurozone banks’ significant holdings in the Greek 
sovereign debt, the “Greek crisis” contagiously affected the financial sector and 
sovereign debt in the other Eurozone countries. Subsequently complicated by the 
public debt crises of Ireland, Portugal and Spain
1
, the Greek crisis was rolled into a 
fully-fledged European sovereign debt crisis (the Eurozone crisis). The 
unprecedented Eurozone crisis has caused significant concerns to the policymakers. 
A new institution called the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) has since 
been founded by 17 Eurozone countries. The EFSF issued its first rescue package on 
9 May 2010 for up to €750 billion to ensure the financial stability of Greece (G1). 
This is then followed by the rescue packages for Ireland on 25 January 2011 (I), 
Portugal on 15 June 2011 (P) and the second bailout to Greece on 21 July 2011 
(G2).
2
 
The goal of this paper is to understand the ways by which default risk is 
transferred, if any, between the sovereign countries and the domestic financial 
institutions during the European sovereign debt crisis. We assess the effectiveness of 
large scale government bailouts that aim at preventing a financial crisis from being 
further propagated into a two-way systemic risk.  
We focus on six Eurozone countries including: Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (the GIIPS countries) and Germany
3
. We use daily 
credit default swap (CDS) spreads to capture default risk, and analyze the risk 
transfer between sovereign and domestic financial institutions in each country from 
November 2007 to October 2012. We examine the structural changes in the 
                                                             
1
 The sovereign debt crisis in Ireland was triggered by the previous Irish banking crisis in 2008 
stemming from a property bubble financed by the six state guaranteed banks. The Portugal crisis was 
caused by the increased public expenses such as high management costs and increased bonuses and 
wages to the government officers. Spain also had a housing bubble. As the housing bubble burst, the 
banking crisis transferred to the sovereign debt. 
2
 See the Supplementary Documents for details of the EFSF guarantees and the settlements of the 
bailout packages for these countries. 
3
 We also examine the results for Austria, Belgium, France and Netherlands, but due to the 
limitations of the tables, we only take Germany as the non-GIIPS country for comparison. See 
Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other countries. 
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relationship between the CDS series of sovereign countries and financial institutions.  
First, we explore the dynamic cointegration relationship with endogenous 
regime shifts using the model of Hansen and Seo (2002). From the analysis, we 
identify typical and atypical regimes where these relationships differ. The regime 
containing higher percentage of observations is identified as the typical regime, 
whereas the other is the atypical regime. We find that the identified threshold 
determines the regime shifts between the typical and atypical regimes. The atypical 
regime mainly resides during those periods surrounding the global credit crunch 
(2007-2008) and the Eurozone crisis (2010). 
Further, for each of the bivariate relationships between sovereign and financial 
institutions, we use the model of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to detect the unknown 
timing of the structural breaks, which are reflected in the changes in the intercept or 
the slope coefficients of the model. We find that the dates of the significant 
breakpoints are close to the four bailouts (G1, I, P and G2) issued by the EFSF. We 
then use the four EFSF bailouts as the breakpoints for all the countries and 
investigate the changes in the default risk transfer in the pre- and post-bailout 
periods. 
We are careful in sample coverage, and our methodology is flexible and robust 
to accommodate both exogenous and unobservable regime break points. Our sample 
period extending to 2012 allows a lengthy coverage on recent crisis evolvement and 
a useful time-window for analyzing the effectiveness of the EFSF bailouts. We 
identify regimes with the model of Hansen and Seo (2002) and verify the break 
points by using the model of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to detect the unknown 
timing of structural breaks. We find that the structural breaks coincide with the EFSF 
bailouts. Consequently, we use the first Greek bailout (May 2010) for the breakpoint, 
which is after the breakpoint surrounding the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
Acharya et al. (2014). 
We find that, prior to the first Greek bailout (G1), positive interdependencies 
exist between the default risk of the sovereign and financial institutions. Specifically, 
a shock in the sovereign CDS spread of a country is followed by increases in the 
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CDS spread of the financial institutions in that country, and vice versa. 
Most importantly we find that, after the first Greek bailout, the 
financial-to-sovereign risk transfer for the GIIPS countries that have high sovereign 
default risk becomes either insignificant or negative. This evidence indicates that the 
default risks of financial institutions lose their positive impacts on the sovereign 
default risk. In contrast, the strong and positive influences of the sovereign default 
risk on its domestic financial institutions remain. 
On the contrary, Germany as the main EFSF guarantees is not in the two-way 
feedback loop even before the bailouts issued. Intuitively, the GIIPS countries are 
the main beneficiaries of the bailouts, the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer in the 
GIIPS countries breaks down after the bailouts. The evidence suggests that since the 
G1 bailout is supported by the EFSF guarantee countries, the bank-to-sovereign risk 
transfer in the two-way feedback breaks down, and the sovereign risk is transferred 
to the other bailout guarantees. 
Moreover, for later bailouts in Greece (the second bailout), Ireland and Portugal, 
we find that the default risk transfer from financial sector to government becomes 
insignificant. This evidence supports the initiative of large-scale bailouts by the 
EFSF: the first Greek bailout (G1) has been a success in breaking the 
bank-to-sovereign risk transfer, and in ending the two-way feedback loop. These 
effects are not only beneficial for Greece, but also for the other countries such as 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Our evidence derives a policy implication that a 
determined large bailout, such as G1, is indeed capable of preventing the 
exaggeration of risk transfer from the financial to the sovereign sector. 
Previous theoretical literature on the bank bailouts mainly focuses on the costs 
and benefits of the bank bailouts at the individual level (Mailath and Mester (1994)) 
and at the aggregate level of the banking sector (Penati and Protopapadakis (1988) 
and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007)). While on the other hand, the theoretical 
literature on the sovereign default risk focuses on the collateral impacts of sovereign 
defaulting on the financial sector through bank holdings of the government debt 
from domestic or foreign countries (Broner et al. (2008), Acharya and Rajan (2013) 
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and Gennaioli et al. (2010)). Acharya et al. (2014) consider the effects from the both 
sides and define the default risk transfer between the sovereign and financial sectors 
as a “two-way feedback” effect.  
Previous empirical studies on financial crisis before 2010 show that increases in 
sovereign default risk may reduce foreign credit to the domestic private sectors via a 
decline in credit supply (see, e.g., Drudi and Giordano 2000; Dooley and Verma 
2001; and Tomz and Wright 2008). The increased sovereign default risk also causes 
a decrease in the aggregate demand of credit. Kim and Wu (2008) show that 
sovereign credit ratings raise sovereign credit ratings have positive impacts on 
domestic stock markets and the banking sector. The other related study is Alter and 
Schüler (2012) who analyze the impacts of bank bailouts during the period 
2007-2010 on the interdependencies between the sovereign and banking sectors, and 
conclude that the contagion (default risk transfer within domestic countries) 
disperses into different directions after the bank bailouts. 
Acharya et al. (2014) use OLS to estimate relation between the changes in CDS 
of the banking and the sovereign sector and find that positive “two-way feedback” 
interdependencies exist between the sovereign and the financial default risks during 
the post-bailout period. They interpret that since governments and banks hold debts 
of each other, a bailout injection into the banking sector could cause a two-way 
feedback effect between the two sectors. In contrast, our study sheds important 
insight into the effectiveness of large scale bailouts in preventing a financial crisis, 
while our evidence complements the findings of Acharya et al. (2014). Our evidence 
shows that, before the first Greek bailout, the risk transfers have been positive, both 
sovereign-to-banks and the banks-to-sovereign, indicating that these countries have 
entered into a feedback loop. Our finding of the two-way feedback between the 
sovereign and financial sectors during the pre-bailout period, which covers the whole 
sample period in Acharya et al. (2014), is consistent with Acharya et al. (2014). 
The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows. Section 2 explains the 
mechanism of risk transfer between the sovereign and financial sectors. We use 
Greece for illustration purpose as our evidence points toward the effectiveness of the 
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first Greek bailout. Section 3 describes the data and our sample. Section 4 explains 
our estimation methodology. Section 5 analyzes the results and reports our findings. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Risk Transfer Mechanism 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the risk-transfer mechanism in the case of Greece. As 
detailed in our analysis later, before the first Greek bailout issued by the EFSF, a 
“two-way feedback” effect exists between the default risks of sovereign and the 
financial sector, indicating positive interdependences. After Greece starts the 
application of the EFSF bailout to support its financial sector, the bailout burden is 
shared by the other EFSF guarantees such as Germany and even by the whole 
Eurozone in the short run. The Greek government then receives the bailout from the 
EFSF guarantees. Thus, instead of Greece taking over the debt of its own financial 
sector, the default risk gets transferred to other Eurozone countries. Hence, the 
bank-to-sovereign risk transfer in this two-way feedback loop breaks down after the 
EFSF bailouts issued. We term this as the “Greek effect”.  
 
Figure 1. "Two-way feedback" loop using Greece as an example. Before any bailout interventions, a 
"two-way feedback" effect exists between the default risks of sovereign and the domestic financial 
sector of Greece and other countries. After the bailouts, the positive feedback from the Greek 
financial sector to the Greek sovereign sector might be broken down and transferred to other countries, 
as the other Eurozone guarantee countries are taking over the bailout debt burdens together 
The result of this Greek effect is the lack of “the two-way feedback effect” when 
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Ireland and Portugal received bailouts from the EFSF later. This is because the 
default risk had already been priced during the first Greek bailout. This reflects the 
perception of market participants in that these countries may also request and would 
be granted bailouts from the EFSF in the future. Thus the price of the default has 
been adjusted after the first Greek bailout. 
Our findings also indicate that the outcomes of other bailouts are heterogeneous 
among the European countries. The private-to-public risk transfer was influenced in 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain during the first Greek bailout, but not in other countries 
such as Germany which has more stable financial system. Dieckmann and Plank 
(2012) report that the states of the financial system at the beginning of the financial 
crisis have strong explanatory power for the private-to-public risk transfer, and that 
an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) member is more sensitive to the health of 
its pre-crisis financial system.  
On the other hand, “the two-way feedback” effect between a government and its 
own domestic financial sectors prior to the first Greek bailout issued by the EFSF 
can be understood as follows. When a country faces financial distress, be it 
stemming from high public deficit or heavy debt burdens, the sovereign default risk 
of this country rises and the sovereign debt devalues. In the short run, (i) for the 
domestic financial institutions the cost of holding the sovereign debt is higher, which 
impacts the balance sheet of the financial institutions; (ii) for other governments that 
support the financially distressed country by providing bailout packages, the 
sovereign and financial sectors of the supporting countries also face higher default 
risk for holding the devaluated sovereign debt. The financial systemic risk, which is 
the impacts of macroeconomic factors on banking credit risk, is procyclical to the 
business cycle or macroeconomic environment (see, Borio et al. 2002; Marcucci and 
Quagliariello 2009; and Festic, et al. 2011). In the long run, sovereign debt crises are 
followed by reductions in foreign capital inflows as investors’ awareness to the 
sovereign default risk increases, and the domestic credit becomes more expensive, 
which negatively affects the domestic economy and hence increase the default risk 
of the domestic financial institutions.  
7 
Likewise, increased default probability of a financial institution increases the 
likelihood that the counterparties may find themselves facing funding difficulties, 
thereby increasing the default risk of the counterparties. A systemic financial crisis 
thus arises and hampers the economy, which in turn, deteriorates public finances, 
resulting in higher sovereign default risk.  
In order to combat a potential systemic financial crisis, a government can issue a 
bailout to domestic financial institutions via increasing taxes or diluting existing 
government debt (hence raising the insolvency ratio). However, bailouts are costly, 
and increased taxation transfers the burden of default risk from the public to the 
private sectors. A Government that issues bailouts has to sacrifice its credit risk, 
which means that domestic bailouts can drive the risk transfer into a vicious 
two-way feedback loop.  
3. Data and Sample 
Our analysis uses credit default swap (CDS) spreads to capture credit default risk of 
an institution, or the government. Prior studies have shown that CDS spreads can 
measure investors’ risk preference. According to Hull et al. (2004), both changes and 
levels of CDS spread contain significant information in estimating the probability of 
rating events. Changes in CDS spread are conditional on rating events, and 
downgrade announcements and negative outlooks do not have helpful information. 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) analyze the relationship between the sovereign CDS 
spreads and the sovereign credit ratings, and show that investors can make decisions 
according to the same public information that would lead to the changes in CDS 
spreads prior to a rating announcement. Düllmann and Sosinska (2007) analyze the 
CDS spreads of banks, and document that banks’ CDS spreads indicate banking 
credit risk from three risk sources including idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk and 
liquidity risk. 
The daily data of CDS spreads is collected from Datastream. The selection of 
financial institution and sovereign CDS series is restricted by data availability. 
Cyprus, Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia are excluded because data of corporate CDS 
series are not available; Luxemburg is excluded as no data of sovereign CDS series 
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are provided; Malta is excluded as neither corporate nor sovereign CDS series are 
available; and Finland is excluded because CDS series data of financial institutions 
are not available.  
We analyze six Eurozone countries, including Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy 
(IT), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) (the GIIPS countries) and Germany (DE)
4
, together 
with their domestic financial institutions. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have 
requested for the bailout funding from the EFSF, and Italy has also been facing 
severe default risk. Germany is the main guarantee of the EFSF that has contributed 
the most to the bailouts. For each country, except for Greece which has one financial 
institution, we analyse the largest and the smallest financial institutions by total 
assets
5
. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and 
Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), Unicredit and Banca Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco 
Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal), Banco Santander and 
Banco De Sabadell (Spain), and Deutsche Bank and Hannover Re (Germany). The 
CDS series of the financial institutions are chosen according to the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code of the institutions (major groups 60-67, 
including Finance, Insurance, and Real Estates), respectively. 
Our study uses five-year CDS since it is the largest and the most liquid 
constituent of the CDS markets
6
. Our sample starts from 13 November 2007. The 
Greek CDS series stops on 17 February 2012 because Greek debt restructuring 
triggered approximately $3.2bn CDS credit protection payout on Greek sovereign 
debt in early March 2012. The CDS series for other countries extends until 08 
October 2012. 
To investigate the sovereign-and-bank interdependencies for the first Greek 
                                                             
4
 We also examine the results for Austria, Belgium, France and Netherlands, but due to space 
constraints, we only report Germany as the non-GIIPS country for comparison. The results of other 
countries are available on request. 
5
 For Ireland, Italy, Spain and Germany, we examine the results for more than three financial 
institutions in each country. Due to space constrains, we only report the results of the largest and the 
smallest financial institutions. The results of other financial institutions in these countries are 
available on request. 
6
 The restructuring type of the sovereign CDS series is Complete Restructuring (CR), as it is the only 
restructuring clause applied by the sovereign CDS series. The restructuring type of the financial 
institutions is Modified-Modified (MM) Restructuring. The MM restructuring clause has been 
introduced and applied by the European market participants since 2003. 
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bailout (G1), we use the G1 bailout date (9 May 2010) to separate the data set into 
two sub-periods
7
. For later bailouts by the EFSF (I, P and G2), we set breakpoints 
according to the respective bailout dates (see section 5.3). 
Panels A, B and C of Figure 2 display the co-movement of the sovereign CDS 
spreads and the CDS spreads of domestic financial institutions in Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, respectively. The bailout periods for Greece (first (G1) and second (G2) 
bailouts), Ireland (I) and Portugal (P) are displayed. Before February 2010, the 
sovereign CDS spreads of all the countries were low and stable. The sovereign CDS 
spreads of the GIIPS countries increase significantly after the first Greek bailout 
(G1), indicating that these countries have been suffering severe sovereign default 
risk during the Eurozone crisis. Except for the Greek sovereign CDS spreads 
remaining high, the sovereign CDS spreads of other countries have started to come 
down since the second Greek bailout (G2). The CDS spreads of the institutions 
increased after the Greek first bailout (G1), and then reached the peak at the second 
Greek bailout (G2). 
[Insert Figure 2] 
4. Estimation Methodology 
We analyze the default risk between the sovereign and financial sectors in two 
stages.
8
 First, we apply the model of Hansen and Seo (2002) to test a threshold 
relationship in dynamic regimes and apply the model by Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
to detect the structural breaks in each bivariate relationship. We examine and that the 
                                                             
7
 On 9 May 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) set out the first bailout package to 
Greece worth up to €750 billion aiming at rescuing financial stability across the European countries. 
8 Prior to the estimation of the VAR and VEC models, we test the unit roots of the log-level CDS 
spreads and the first differences of the log levels using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
(detailed results available on request). To test the cointegration of the I(1) variables for each bivariate 
model, Johansen's trace tests are applied except for the ADF tests (see Appendix 1). If the variable in 
log-levels can be cointegrated, i.e., reject maximum rank at 0 or 1, we proceed to estimate the VEC. 
The optimal lag order p in the VAR and the VEC models is determined by, on the one hand, 
minimising the common information criteria in the underlying VAR model of the log-levels, and on 
the other hand considering autocorrelations of the residuals and joint tests of reducing unnecessary 
lags in the models. The VEC model is estimated via Johansen's maximum likelihood method and the 
VAR model via ordinary least squares. 
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structural breaks coincide with the EFSF bailouts. We then use the breakpoints for all 
the countries to investigate the changes in the default risk in the pre- and post-bailout 
periods.  
Second, to examine the long-run cointegration between the two sectors, we use 
the vector autoregression (VAR) and the vector error correction (VEC) models in 
each of the periods of the identified regimes. For the short-run analysis, we apply the 
impulse response functions (IRFs) to capture the differences of shock transmitting 
mechanism between banks and country. Since each bank responds differently to 
shocks in a country, we estimate IRFs separately for each pair of bank and country. 
As such, there is no common market-wide effect. We control for bank and sovereign 
fixed effects by estimating the models separately for each pair of bank and country. 
4.1. Two-Regime Threshold Cointegration in VEC Model 
We estimate threshold VEC models using the variables cdsSov,t, the log of sovereign 
CDS spreads (in short ‘Sov’) and cdsFi,t, the log of CDS spreads of a domestic 
financial institution (in short ‘Fi’), as proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002). 
,1 , ,1 , ,1 ,
1 1 1 1
1,1 , ,1 , ,1 ,,
, ,2 , ,2 , ,2
2 1
,2 , ,2
, ,
l
Sov SovSov i SovFi i Sov t i
t t t
iFi FiSov i FiFi i Fi t iSov t
Fi t Sov SovSov i SovFi i
t
Fi FiSov i Fi
cds
w u if w
cdscds
cds
w
  
 
  
  

  

 
 

     
               
 
   
  
 

,
2 1
1 , ,2 ,
, ,
l
Sov t i
t t
i Fi i Fi t i
cds
u if w
cds



 




   
       

where 1,1,1   tFitSovt cdscdsw  , which is the estimated cointegrating relationship 
between the two CDS series. Once the threshold (γ) is estimated and conditioned, the 
regime with higher percentage of observations is defined as the typical regime, and 
the other is defined as the atypical regime. In the typical regime, tSovcds ,  and 
tFicds ,  have minimal error-correction effects and minimal dynamics. In the 
atypical regime the two series deviate more from the long-term cointegration, 
meaning that the error-correction effect is stronger. 
4.2. Testing the Unknown Timing of Structural Breakpoints 
We also apply the models of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to detect statistical 
breakpoints in each bivariate relationship, and to check whether the actual bailout 
events coincide with the statistical breakpoints. The model of Gregory and Hansen 
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(1996) treats the timing of a structural change as unknown. The structural change 
would be reflected in changes in the intercept and/or the slope coefficients. The 
models are expressed as a Level Shift (C) when there is a break in the intercept only, 
or a Regime Shift (C/S) when there is a break in the intercept and the slope of the 
cointegrating relationship. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no cointegration between the two variables in 
the presence of a regime shift at unknown timing. The ADF-, Zα-, and Zt-type tests 
are taken to test the null hypothesis, and the critical values are calculated by 
simulation methods. 
4.3. IRF of VAR and VEC Models:  Pre- and Post-Bailout Periods 
The analysis in Section 4.2 shows that there are breaks near the EFSF bailouts. We 
therefore use the VAR and VEC models to analyse the pre- and post-bailout risk 
transfer between the sovereign and financial sectors. Subsequently, we use the EFSF 
bailouts as the breakpoints for the whole period. For example, for the first Greek 
bailout, we use the bailout date as the only breakpoint to separate the data into the 
pre- and the post-bailout sub-periods and analyze the bivariate relationship in each 
country in both the sub-periods. We estimate the VAR and VEC models with a 
sovereign CDS spread and a domestic financial institution's CDS spread. 
We use impulse response functions (IRF) of VAR models using the log CDS 
spreads. IRFs are used to depict the impacts of one-time shock to a ‘Sov’ (a domestic 
‘Fi’) within one standard deviation not only on the ‘Sov’ (‘Fi’) itself but also on the 
domestic ‘Fi’ (‘Sov’) of current (1, 2 and 5 days) and future (22 days) periods.  
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Results from Two-Regime Threshold VEC Model 
This section reports the estimation of Hansen and Seo's (2002) model for detecting 
typical and atypical regimes and for testing cointegrating relationship between the 
default risk of the sovereign debts and financial institutions.  
[Insert Table 1, 2 and 3] 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the cointegration results of the linear VEC model 
without threshold, typical regime and atypical regime, respectively. For exposition 
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purpose, we use as an example the log CDS spreads of Greek sovereign debt and the 
log CDS spreads of Alpha Bank (see Table 1, 2 and 3). The estimated VEC without a 
threshold effect is given below 

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where the cointegrating relationship is 235.0418.1 .,  tFitSov cdscds . Then the 
model by Hansen and Seo (2002) is used, the estimated cointegration is 
tFitSovt cdscdsw ., 451.1 , and the estimated threshold is -1.001.  
The estimated threshold VEC is shown below: 
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From the above, the relatively usual regime occurs when 
001.1451.1 .,  tFitSov cdscds , with 94% of the observations in this regime, and this 
is defined as the typical regime. The other regime (with 6% of the observations) is 
defined as the atypical regime when 001.1451.1 .,  tFitSov cdscds . 
The coefficient of tSovcds ,  in the atypical regime is 0.500, which is much 
larger than the coefficient in the typical regime (0.105). The other coefficients of 
tSovcds ,  and tFicds ,  in the atypical regime are insignificant in this case. 
However, comparing the results of Table 2 and 3, in general the absolute values of 
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the coefficients of 
tSovcds ,  and tFicds ,  in the atypical regime are much larger 
than those in the typical regime. The estimated results indicate that in the typical 
regime, 
tSovcds ,  and tFicds ,  have minimal error-correction effects and minimal 
dynamics, while in the atypical regime the error-correction effect is stronger. 
Figures 3 shows, respectively, the CDS spreads of sovereign debts and financial 
institution in each of the GIIPS countries, together with the typical and atypical 
regimes estimated from the threshold VEC model. For example, the first figure 
shows the co-movements of CDS spreads of Greek sovereign debt and Alpha Bank. 
The grey areas indicate the typical regime, and the white areas (in early 2008 and 
March 2012) show the structural breaks or the atypical regime of the two CDS series. 
The four vertical lines indicate the four bailouts issued to Greece (two bailouts), 
Ireland and Portugal by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) during the 
Eurozone crisis. The findings show that the atypical regime usually happens when 
the co-moving trend of the bi-variables changes, indicating the cointegration 
relationship between the bi-variables changes. Moreover, the atypical regime shows 
that the structural breaks mainly locate around the global credit crunch period 
(2007-2008) and the Eurozone crisis.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
After displaying the typical and atypical regimes of each pair of bi-variables, we 
analyze the impulse responses of all the GIIPS countries in different regimes. Table 4 
shows the impulse responses of the five countries in the two regimes. The responses 
after 1, 2, and 5 days represent the short-term effect, and the responses after 22 days 
show the long-run effect. For example, in the typical regime, the responses of Alpha 
Bank to the impulse in Greek Sov after 1, 2 and 5 days are 0.04, 0.06 and 0.09, 
respectively, and the response after 22 days is 0.27. The responses of Greek Sov to 
the impulse in Alpha Bank after 1, 2 and 5 days are -0.01, -0.02 and -0.04, 
respectively, and the response after 22 days is -0.11. 
[Insert Table 4] 
We observe that, for the GIIPS countries except Greece, in the typical regime, a 
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two-way feedback effect exists between the default risk of the sovereign and 
financial sectors, as most of the responses of financial institutions to the sovereign 
CDS shocks are significantly positive, and vice versa, in both the short and long run. 
For example, for the pair of Irish Sov and Bank of Ireland, the responses of Bank of 
Ireland to the impulses in Irish Sov after 2, 5 and 22 days are significantly positive 
(0.04, 0.09 and 0.27, respectively); the responses of Irish Sov to the impulses in 
Bank of Ireland after 1, 2, 5 and 22 days are also significantly positive (0.11, 0.10, 
0.11 and 0.13, respectively). Importantly, in the atypical regime, we find that while 
the positive interdependencies between the sovereign and financial sectors remain 
significant, the responses to the changes in the impulse variables become much 
larger generally than that in the typical regime. For the pair of Irish Sov and Bank of 
Ireland, the responses of Bank of Ireland to the impulses in Irish Sov after 1, 2, 5 and 
22 days are significantly positive (0.14, 0.15, 0.27 and 0.40, respectively); the 
responses of Irish Sov to the impulses in Bank of Ireland after 1, 2, 5 and 22 days are 
also significantly positive (0.13, 0.12, 0.19 and 0.27, respectively). These results 
indicate, as explained in Section 2, that the sensitively of the financial institutions’ 
default risk to the sovereign default risk increase for these countries, and vice versa. 
In comparison, the interdependent relationship between the sovereign and 
financial sectors of Greece is different from other GIIPS countries. In the typical 
regime, the impact of sovereign default risk on the default risk of the domestic 
financial sector is positively significant, whereas the impact of domestic financial 
sector on the sovereign sector remains insignificant. In the atypical regime for 
Greece, the impacts of the sovereign default risk on the default risk of the financial 
institutions are reduced to zero. In a sharp contrast, the sovereign default risk 
exhibits strong and negative responses to the shock in the default risk of the financial 
institutions. For example, in the atypical regime, the responses of Greek Sov to the 
impulse in Alpha Bank after 1, 2 and 5 days are -34.99, -33.03 and -24.83, 
respectively. Such heterogeneous results in Greece indicate that in the atypical 
regime the negative force of the impact of the financial sector on the sovereign 
default risk is much stronger than the positive force. This is because the state of the 
15 
financial system of a country since the beginning of the financial crisis has strong 
explanatory power for the private-to-public risk transfer. For Greece, as the 
government debt has been already relatively high before and at the beginning of the 
credit crunch period, the sensitivity of the sovereign default risk to a shock in the 
domestic financial sector is exaggerated when Greece has to issue more sovereign 
debt in later crisis. 
5.2. Determining Structural Breakpoints 
In this section, the tests (as described in section 4.2) of Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
are applied to detect structural breaks in the log-CDS series. We use the log-CDS 
series of Greek sovereign debt and Alpha Bank for exposition purpose, and Table 5 
shows the results. In Panel A of Table 5, the results in the ADF, Zt and Zα tests using 
the regime shift (C/S) model suggest that the breakpoints are on 12 May 2010 and 21 
September 2011. The date of the first breakpoint is very close to the first Greek 
bailout on 9 May 2010. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Likewise, we detect the breakpoints in the CDS series of Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain using the Gregory and Hansen (1996) models. Panel B of Table 5 shows 
the summary of the level shift (C) and the regime shift (C/S) breakpoints for the 
GIIPS countries. These significant breakpoints are close to the four bailouts (G1, I, P 
G2) by the EFSF, indicating that the bailouts change the pattern of interdependencies 
of the default risk between the sovereign and financial sectors. Thus, setting 
sub-periods according to the timing of the EFSF bailouts is both intuitive and 
supported by statistical evidence. 
 
5.3. Default Risk Transfer: Pre- and Post-Bailout Periods 
As we show earlier, the actual bailout dates are close to the breakpoints of the CDS 
series, for the time period of the first Greek bailout, we use the G1 issue date (9 May 
2010) as the breakpoint for the GIIPS countries and Germany. For later EFSF 
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bailouts (I, P and G2)
9
, sub-periods are set for Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
according to the country’s application and/or bailout dates, respectively. 
Five sub-periods are set for Greece. The first period, pre-bailout period, ending 
at 9 May 2010, is the settlement date of the first tranche of the bailout worth €20 
billion. The official request for rescue from the Greek government was issued on 23 
April 2010, and a three-year financial aid programme (loan commitments) worth 
€110 billion was agreed on 2 May 2010 by the European Union (EU), European 
Central Bank (ECB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF).10 As the application 
period before the first bailout is short, we include this period into the pre-bailout 
period. The first bailout period starts from 10 May 2010 and ends on 21 July 2011, 
which is the approval date of the second rescue package agreed by the 17 EFSF 
guarantees. The application period of the second bailout ends on the date of the final 
agreement by the EFSF (20 February 2012), and the second bailout period is 
between the date of the final agreement and the settlement of the last tranche (28 
June 2012). The post-bailout period follows the second bailout period.
11
 As shown 
in Figures 2 and 3, the Greek sovereign CDS spreads have kept increasing from 
354.77 bps to 14904.36 bps. On the other hand, the CDS spreads of Alpha Bank have 
started to decrease since the second bailout period. This difference in the sovereign 
and banking CDS spreads suggests, as in the last section, that the financial sector 
might have transferred part of the credit default risk to the sovereign balance sheets 
in Greece. Acharya et al. (2014) show similar results that the sovereign CDS spreads 
increase, while the banking CDS spreads decrease in the post-bailout period of the 
previous financial crisis. 
The programme for Ireland has been separated into four sub-periods. The 
pre-bailout period is separated into the period before application and the application 
                                                             
9
 Spain is not included in this section. Although the Spanish government issued the official request 
for financial bailout to the EFSF on 25 June 2012, the EFSF has not confirmed the settlement dates of 
bailouts. 
10
 The first Greek bailout programme has been discontinued, and the remaining amount (€24.4 billion 
to be disbursed by the Eurozone countries) has been transferred to the EFSF. 
11
 The sovereign CDS spread of Greece has remained unchanged due to Greek debt restructuring in 
early March 2012, thus there is no further analysis of Greek risk transfer for the bailout and 
post-bailout periods during the second Greek bailout. 
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period. The application period starts after 21 November 2010, which is the date the 
Irish government made official request, and ends before 25 January 2011, which is 
the issue date of the first tranche worth €5 billion. The bailout period is between the 
issue date of the first tranche and the settlement date of the final tranche on 03 April 
2012, and the post-bailout period afterwards. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, both the 
banking and sovereign CDS spreads have kept increasing from the period before 
application to the post-bailout period in Ireland. The rescue programme for Portugal 
is also set into four sub-periods, and the methodology to set sub-periods is similar to 
that of Ireland. The breakpoints for Portugal are 06 April 2011, 14 June 2011 and 17 
July 2012. For Portugal, both the banking and sovereign CDS spreads have dropped 
significantly in the post-bailout period. 
5.3.1. Results of First Greek Bailout 
Table 6 reports the results of cointegration analysis for the GIIPS countries and 
Germany before and after the first Greek bailout issued by the EFSF. 
[Insert Table 6] 
According to the VEC model, βSov and βFi reveal the long-term relationship between 
the sovereign and the financial institution’s default risks. Normalizing βSov to 1 we 
get: 
0,,   tFiFitSov cdscds                                                
Thus a negative βFi indicates that the relationship between the two sectors is 
positive. In Table 6, the results show that the βFi coefficients of the GIIPS countries 
and Germany are significantly negative (except the pair of Spanish Sov and Banco 
De Sabadell before the bailout in Panel A), for the periods both before and after G1. 
For examples, the βFi coefficients of Alpha Bank, Banca Popolare De Milano and 
Deutsche Bank are significantly negative before G1 (-0.83, -21.98 and -3.94, 
respectively) and after G1 (-2.08, -0.68 and -1.50, respectively). The coefficients αSov 
and αFi measure the speed of adjustment towards the long-term relationship. The 
coefficients are significant and have opposite signs to their respective β coefficients, 
indicating that the CDS series are attracted back to the long-run equilibrium. 
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Next, we analyze the results of impulse responses of all the countries (GIIPS 
and Germany). Table 7 shows the results of IRFs for GIIPS and Germany before and 
after the first Greek bailout (G1). The responses after 1, 2 and 5 days represent the 
short-term effects, and the responses after 22 days reveal the long-run effects.  
Before G1, the results show that a two-way feedback effect exists for the GIIPS 
countries. Specifically, most of the responses of financial institutions to the 
sovereign CDS shocks are significantly positive, and vice versa, for both the short 
and long run. The results indicate that prior to the first Greek bailout, changes in the 
sovereign default risk affect the credit default risk of the domestic financial 
institutions, and vice versa. For example, the responses of Bank of Ireland to the 
impulses in Irish Sov after 1, 2, 5 and 22 days are significantly positive (0.05, 0.06, 
0.08 and 0.17, respectively), and the responses of Irish Sov to the impulses in Bank 
of Ireland after 1, 2 and 5 days are also significantly positive (0.14, 0.14 and 0.12, 
respectively).  
[Insert Table 7] 
After G1, there is significant effect of default risk transfer in both the short and 
long run for the GIIPS countries. The responses of the financial institutions to the 
sovereign CDS shocks are significantly positive and are even larger than those 
before G1, indicating that the domestic financial institutions are affected stronger by 
the shocks in sovereign default risk after the bailout. For example, after G1, the 
responses of Bank of Ireland to the impulses in Irish Sov after 1, 2, 5 and 22 days are 
significantly larger (0.28, 0.32, 0.46 and 0.82, respectively). On the other hand, the 
responses of the sovereign CDS to the domestic financial institutions become either 
insignificant or significantly negative for most variables after the bailout. The 
responses of Irish Sov to the impulses in Bank of Ireland after 1, 2 and 5 days 
become insignificant (0.03, 0.03 and 0.04, respectively). The results of other GIIPS 
countries show similar pattern. This indicates that the default risk transfers from the 
financial sector to the government after the EFSF interventions, and the relieved 
default risk of the financial institutions becomes heavier debt burdens to the 
government. In addition, changes in the default risk of the financial institutions can 
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have negative impacts on the sovereign default risk. 
Germany shows different results of impulse responses. Before G1, larger 
Deutsche Bank shows a two-way feedback with respect to German Sov, but for the 
smaller Hannover Re, the two-way feedback effect is not significant. After G1, there 
is no pattern of risk transfer between the sovereign (German Sov) and financial 
sectors (Deutsche Bank/Hannover Re). Such results indicate that the non-GIIPS 
governments (as represented by Germany) and their domestic financial sectors are 
not facing severe debt crisis, and the governments do not have to take over the 
default risk from their financial sector. The different results of GIIPS and Germany 
are consistent with the notion that the heterogeneity of the rescue packages across 
the countries translates into the asymmetric interdependent relationship between the 
default risk of the sovereign and financial sectors. 
Our empirical results show that the default risk transfer may occur based on the 
current financial situations of the governments and their domestic financial sectors. 
Also the direct capital injection into the financial sector may not relieve the 
sovereign debt crisis. Instead, it further magnifies the impacts of sovereign default 
risk on financial sector through increases in the government debt burdens. 
Our results are different from the results of Acharya et al. (2014). Acharya et al. 
(2014) find that during the pre-bailout periods, there is no sovereign-to-banking risk 
transfer, but after the bailout, there is positive risk transfer. We find that, before the 
first Greek bailout, the sovereign-to-financial and the financial-to-sovereign risk 
transfer has been positive, indicating that the countries have entered into a feedback 
loop. After the bailout, however, the financial-to-sovereign risk transfer for the 
GIIPS countries becomes insignificant or negatively significant. Such results 
indicate that the GIIPS countries are the main beneficiaries of the bailouts, and the 
financial-to-sovereign risk transfer in the GIIPS countries breaks down after the 
bailouts, while the bailouts have less impact on the risk transfer pattern of other 
bailout guarantees. 
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5.3.2. Results of Other EFSF Bailouts (Second Greek Bailout, Irish and 
Portugal Bailouts) 
Table 8 shows the result of the impulse response functions for the Greek sovereign 
and banking CDS series. The results for the periods of the first bailout are similar to 
the results in Section 5.3.1, in which the responses of the financial sector to the 
shocks in the sovereign default risk are positively significant in the period before the 
first Greek bailout, and vice versa. In contrast, the responses of the sovereign default 
risk to the shocks in the financial sector become either insignificant or negatively 
significant in the short run, indicating that risk has been transferred from the 
financial sector to the government balance sheet. However, when analyzing the 
results in the application period of the second Greek bailout, the responses of the 
financial sector default risk to the shocks in the sovereign default risk are 
insignificant, and so are the responses of the sovereign default risk to the shocks in 
the financial sector. Such results indicate that the risk transfer only happens in the 
period of the first Greek bailout. 
[Insert Table 8] 
The “Greek effect” indicates that the default risk of other countries such as 
Ireland and Portugal has been priced or perceived by bond investors during the first 
Greek bailout, and such default risk transfer becomes insignificant when other 
countries issue their own bailouts. Table 9 exhibits the result of the IRFs for the 
government and banking default risks in Ireland for the four sub-periods. The results 
are ambiguous compared to the results of Greece. In the period before the Irish 
bailout application, the responses of the financial sector to the shocks in the 
government default risk are positively significant, but the responses of the 
government to the shocks in the financial sector are insignificant. For example, the 
responses of Bank of Ireland to the impulses in Irish Sov after 1, 2, 5 and 22 days are 
significantly positive (0.09, 0.17, 0.38 and 0.94, respectively), and the responses of 
Irish Sov to the impulses in Bank of Ireland after 1, 2, 5 and 22 days become 
insignificant (-0.05, -0.09, -0.21 and -0.51, respectively). However, in the periods of 
application, bailout and post-bailout, there is no clear pattern of risk transfer between 
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the sovereign and financial sectors. But since the CDS spreads of both the sovereign 
and banking debts have been increasing, the results show that the crisis in the 
financial sector has not been relieved after the bailout to the government of Ireland. 
[Insert Table 9] 
Table 10 shows the results of the IRFs for the sovereign and banking CDS series 
in Portugal. In the period before bailout application and the post-bailout period, the 
responses of banking default risk to the shocks in the government default risk are 
positively significant, while the responses of the government default risk to the 
shocks in the financial sector are all insignificant. For example, for the pair of 
Portuguese Sov and Banco Comercial Portugues, in the period of pre-bailout, the 
responses of Banco Comercial Portugues to the impulses in Portuguese Sov after 1, 
2, 5 and 22 days are significantly positive (0.26, 0.38, 0.51 and 0.74, respectively), 
and the responses of Portuguese Sov to the impulses in Banco Comercial Portugues 
after 1, 2, 5 and 22 days are insignificant (-0.17, -0.20, -0.13 and 0.09, respectively). 
However, in both the application and bailout periods, the responses of the financial 
sector to the shocks in the sovereign default risk become insignificant, and vice 
versa. 
[Insert Table 10] 
When sub-periods are reset for Ireland and Portugal according to their own 
bailouts received, respectively, the default risk transfer from the banking sector to 
the government is not significant, compared to the results in Section 5.3.1, that the 
bank-to-government risk transfer is significantly positive. The risk transfer from the 
financial sector to the sovereign default risk is significant to the countries that have 
potential defaults, only when the first Greek bailout is issued. Such difference 
indicates that the risk of default had already been priced for Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. Given the Greek experience, bond investors have perceived that these 
countries might also request and receive the bailouts from the EFSF guarantees in 
the future. For Ireland and Portugal, the transfer of default risk in the banking sector 
to the government was priced after the Greek bailout was approved. Thus by the time 
these countries requested their own bailouts, such effect disappears. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use different approaches to examine the structural changes of the 
relationship between the sovereign and the financial institutions’ CDS series during 
the European sovereign debt crisis. We first apply a bivariate VEC model with a 
threshold effect of Hansen and Seo (2002) to test the cointegrating relationship in 
two regimes, typical and atypical regimes. Our findings show that the threshold 
determines the regime shifts, and that the atypical regime is around the global credit 
crunch in 2007-2008 and the 2010 Eurozone crisis. 
We then use the models of Gregory and Hansen (1996) to estimate the unknown 
timing of the structural breaks in each bivariate relationship. We find that the 
significant breakpoints are close to the four bailouts (G1, I, P G2) carried out by the 
EFSF. Accordingly, we apply the four bailouts from the EFSF as the breakpoints for 
all the countries and investigate the changes in the default risk transfer in the pre- 
and post-bailout periods. 
Before the first Greek bailout (G1), we find that the two-way feedback effect 
exists between the sovereign and financial sectors in both the short and the long runs. 
After the first Greek bailout (G1), the shocks in the financial sector either exert 
significantly negative impacts or lose influences on the sovereign sector. In a sharp 
contrast, the later bailouts from the EFSF (G2, I and P) do not show this pattern 
change in the two-way risk transfer. Importantly, the two-way feedback is not even 
significant during the pre-bailout periods for the later bailouts. 
Our evidence suggests that the first Greek bailout helps alleviate the financial 
systemic risk and successfully transfers the aggregated sovereign risk to the EFSF, 
which is supported together by the Eurozone guarantee countries. However, since 
investors have perceived the forthcoming bailouts, and the two-way risk transfer has 
been priced after the first Greek bailout, the two-way feedback loop is not shown in 
later EFSF bailouts. 
There are limitations to the EFSF bailout programme, as the EFSF only raises 
funds after an official aid request is made by a country. The EFSF funds are given to 
the governments, which in turn bailout individual institutions in the country, leading 
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to increases in the government default risk. The EFSF has been improved to become 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a permanent bailout funding programme, 
and the current Spanish bailout has been passed on to the ESM in early 2013. The 
funds from the ESM are transferred in the form of ESM notes to individual banks 
through FROB, and these banks have been confirmed to receive certain amounts 
according to the bailout scheme. Further research could focus on the Spanish case in 
order to make comparison for different bailout policies. 
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Panel A. CDS Spreads of Greek Sovereign Debt and Domestic Financial Institution 
 
Panel B. CDS Spreads of Irish Sovereign Debt and Domestic Financial Institutions 
 
Panel C. CDS Spreads of Portugal Sovereign Debt and Domestic Financial Institutions 
 
Figure 2. CDS Spreads for Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
Four settlement dates of EFSF bailouts to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as G1, I, P, and G2. The first Greek bailout is 
on 9 May 2010 (G1), and Greece officially requested for the second bailout on 21 July 2011 (G2). The settlement date of the 
tranche of Irish bailout is on 25 January 2011 (I), and for Portugal is on 15 June 2011 (P). Since Greek debt restructuring triggered 
approximately $3.2bn CDS credit protection payouts on Greek sovereign debt in early March 2012, the sovereign CDS spread of 
Greece has remained unchanged. The three-letter variables represent domestic financial institutions in the corresponding country. 
For each country (except for Greece with one financial institution), we show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest 
financial institutions by total assets. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks 
(Ireland) and Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal). See Supplementary Documents for the detailed 
results of other financial institutions in these countries. 
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Figure 3. CDS Spreads of Sovereign Debts and Financial Institutions in Typical and Atypical Regimes for GIIPS. 
Four settlement dates of EFSF bailouts to Greece, Ireland and Portugal are denoted as G1, I, P, and G2. The grey parts indicate the 
typical regime, and the white parts show the atypical regime. For each country (except for Greece with one financial institution), 
we show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial institutions by total assets. These financial institutions are 
Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), Unicredit and Banca Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco 
Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal) and Banco Santander and Banco De Sabadell (Spain). See 
Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other financial institutions in these countries. 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
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Figure 3 (continued) 
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Table 1. Cointegration Analysis of Linear VECM Estimates for GIIPS Countries 
Testing for cointegration 
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where 
1,1,1   tFitSovt cdscdsw  . 
β coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, and the α coefficients are adjustment speeds of the 
two variables towards their long-term relationships. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 0.1 level. For each country 
(except for Greece with one financial institution), we show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial 
institutions by total assets. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), 
Unicredit and Banca Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal) and Banco 
Santander and Banco De Sabadell (Spain). See Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other financial institutions in 
these countries. 
ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi 
Cointegration 
β Constant 
Greece 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 0.13
*
 -0.01
*
 
1.42 0.24 
Alpha Bank 0.02
*
 0.01
*
 0.04
*
 -0.02
*
 
Ireland 0.03
*
 0.00
*
 -0.19 0.10
*
 
2.13 0.44 
Bank of Ireland 0.06
*
 0.01
*
 0.02 -0.04
*
 
Ireland 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 -0.22 0.15
*
 
1.86 0.42 
Allied Irish Banks 0.05
*
 0.01
*
 -0.03 0.17
*
 
       Italy 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 -0.01
*
 0.13
*
 
1.67 0.22 
Unicredit 0.05
*
 0.01
*
 0.02
*
 0.12
*
 
Italy 0.02
*
 0.00
*
 0.02
*
 0.14
*
 
-0.03 1.23 
Banca Popolare Di Milano 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 0.08
*
 0.11
*
 
Portugal 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 0.10
*
 0.11
*
 
1.43 0.17 
Banco Comercial Portugues 0.03
*
 0.01
*
 0.12
*
 0.13
*
 
Portugal 0.02
*
 0.00
*
 0.10
*
 0.11
*
 
1.62 0.13 
Banco Espirito Santo 0.05
*
 0.01
*
 0.09
*
 0.19
*
 
Spain 0.02
*
 0.01
*
 0.03
*
 0.10
*
 
1.33 0.12 
Banco Santander 0.04
*
 0.02
*
 0.13
*
 0.05
*
 
Spain 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 0.08
*
 0.08
*
 
1.45 0.23 
Banco De Sabadell 0.03
*
 0.01
*
 0.10
*
 0.02
*
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 Table 2. Cointegration Analysis of Typical Regime for GIIPS Countries 
Testing for cointegration 
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where 
1,1,1   tFitSovt cdscdsw  . 
β coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, and the α coefficients are adjustment speeds of the 
two variables towards their long-term relationships. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 0.1 level. For each country 
(except for Greece with one financial institution), we show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial 
institutions by total assets. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), 
Unicredit and Banca Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal) and Banco 
Santander and Banco De Sabadell (Spain). See Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other financial institutions in 
these countries. 
ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Greece 0.00
*
 0.01
*
 0.10
*
 -0.01
*
 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.45  cdsFi,t -1.00  
Alpha Bank 0.01
*
 0.02
*
 0.04
*
 -0.02
*
 
Ireland 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 -0.06
*
 0.09
*
 
cdsSov,t> 1.57  cdsFi,t -4.71  
Bank of Ireland 0.03
*
 0.01
*
 0.01
*
 -0.03 
Ireland 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 -0.08
*
 0.10
*
 
cdsSov,t> 1.42  cdsFi,t -4.10  
Allied Irish Banks 0.04
*
 0.01
*
 -0.04
*
 0.16
*
 
Italy 0.02
*
 0.00
*
 0.13
*
 0.05
*
 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.76 cdsFi,t -3.65 
Unicredit 0.04
*
 0.01
*
 0.06
*
 0.05
*
 
Italy 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 -0.01
*
 0.16
*
 
cdsSov,t≤ 0.69  cdsFi,t +1.83 
Banca Popolare Di Milano 0.00
*
 0.00
*
 0.06
*
 0.14
*
 
Portugal 0.02
*
 0.01
*
 0.12
*
 0.09
*
 
cdsSov,t> 1.37 cdsFi,t -3.05 
Banco Comercial Portugues 0.03
*
 0.01
*
 0.16
*
 0.14
*
 
Portugal 0.02
*
 0.01
*
 0.12
*
 0.08
*
 
cdsSov,t> 1.42  cdsFi,t -3.33  
Banco Espirito Santo 0.04
*
 0.01
*
 0.13
*
 0.18
*
 
Spain 0.03
*
 0.03
*
 0.02
*
 0.11
*
 
cdsSov,t> 1.20  cdsFi,t -1.27  
Banco Santander 0.04
*
 0.04
*
 0.18
*
 0.02
*
 
Spain 0.00
*
 0.00
*
 0.08
*
 0.11
*
 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.46  cdsFi,t -2.49  
Banco De Sabadell 0.01
*
 0.00
*
 0.10
*
 0.07
*
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Table 3. Cointegration Analysis of Atypical Regime for GIIPS Countries 
Testing for cointegration 
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where 
1,1,1   tFitSovt cdscdsw  . 
β coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, and the α coefficients are adjustment speeds of the 
two variables towards their long-term relationships. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 0.1 level. For each country 
(except for Greece with one financial institution), we show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial 
institutions by total assets. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), 
Unicredit and Banca Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal) and Banco 
Santander and Banco De Sabadell (Spain). See Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other financial institutions in 
these countries. 
ΔcdsSov/Fi μ α γSov γFi Cointegration 
Greece -0.01
*
 -0.02
*
 0.50
*
 -41.75  
cdsSov,t> 1.45  cdsFi,t -1.00  
Alpha Bank -0.22  -0.33  -0.10  -39.96  
Ireland -0.21  -0.04
*
 -0.58 0.09
*
 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.57  cdsFi,t -4.71  
Bank of Ireland 0.26  0.06
*
 0.06
*
 -0.01
*
 
Ireland -0.20  -0.05 -0.91 0.46  
cdsSov,t≤ 1.42  cdsFi,t -4.10  
Allied Irish Banks 0.60  0.14
*
 0.04
*
 0.25  
Italy 0.04
*
 0.01
*
 -0.33 0.34  
cdsSov,t> 1.76  cdsFi,t -3.65  
Unicredit 0.11
*
 0.03
*
 -0.1 0.28
*
 
Italy 0.53  -0.28 0.37
*
 0.01
*
 
cdsSov,t> 0.69  cdsFi,t +1.83 
Banca Popolare Di Milano -0.23  0.12
*
 0.18
*
 -0.10
*
 
Portugal -0.53  -0.17
*
 0.01
*
 0.07
*
 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.37  cdsFi,t -3.05  
Banco Comercial Portugues 0.90  0.29
*
 -0.18
*
 0.15
*
 
Portugal -0.72  -0.21 0.01 0.05  
cdsSov,t≤ 1.42  cdsFi,t -3.33  
Banco Espirito Santo 0.69  0.20
*
 -0.15
*
 0.26  
Spain -0.03
*
 -0.02
*
 0.02
*
 -0.01
*
 
cdsSov,t≤ 1.20  cdsFi,t -1.27  
Banco Santander -0.04
*
 -0.02
*
 -0.04
*
 -0.02  
Spain 0.00
*
 -0.01
*
 0.07 0.01  
cdsSov,t> 1.46  cdsFi,t -2.49  
Banco De Sabadell 0.02
*
 0.00
*
 0.00
*
 -0.13  
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Table 4. Impulse Responses in Typical and Atypical Regimes for GIIPS Countries 
A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) increase in the level of the impulse variable. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 0.1 level. The two-letter 
variables indicate the CDS spreads of sovereign debts, and the three-letter variables are domestic financial institutions. For each country (except for Greece with one financial institution), we 
show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial institutions by total assets. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks 
(Ireland), Unicredit and Banca Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal) and Banco Santander and Banco De Sabadell (Spain). See 
Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other financial institutions in these countries. 
  
Typical Regime   Atypical Regime 
Impulse Response 1 2 5 22   1 2 5 22 
Greece Alpha Bank 0.04  0.06  0.09* 0.27*   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Alpha Bank Greece -0.01  -0.02  -0.04  -0.11    -34.99* -33.03* -24.83* -1.93  
Ireland Bank of Ireland 0.03  0.04* 0.09* 0.27*   0.14* 0.15* 0.27* 0.40* 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 0.11* 0.10* 0.11* 0.13*   0.13* 0.12* 0.19* 0.27* 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks -0.01  0.00  0.04* 0.19*   -0.02  0.09  0.24* 0.21* 
Allied Irish Banks Ireland 0.16* 0.15* 0.17* 0.24*   0.62* 0.97* 1.19* 1.06* 
Italy Unicredit 0.08* 0.12* 0.19* 0.41*   -0.02  0.08  0.28* 0.56* 
Unicredit Italy 0.08* 0.09* 0.10* 0.13    0.30* 0.26* 0.18* 0.06  
Italy Banca Popolare Di Milano 0.06* 0.07* 0.07* 0.08    0.38* 0.48* 0.45* 0.39* 
Banca Popolare Di Milano Italy 0.15* 0.17* 0.19* 0.25    0.28* 0.47* 0.59* 0.51* 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.15* 0.21* 0.27* 0.50*   0.30* 0.54* 0.52* 0.47* 
Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal 0.10* 0.12* 0.12* 0.07*   0.32* 0.38* 0.33* 0.30* 
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.14* 0.19* 0.26* 0.49*   0.11  0.29* 0.39* 0.35* 
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal 0.08* 0.10* 0.09* 0.01    0.44* 0.57* 0.57* 0.52* 
Spain Banco Santander 0.22* 0.28* 0.41* 0.84*   0.03  0.06  0.13  0.22* 
Banco Santander Spain 0.09* 0.06  -0.01  -0.29*   0.12  0.33* 0.72* 1.19  
Spain Banco De Sabadell 0.12* 0.14* 0.17* 0.27*   0.05  0.10  0.20* 0.42  
Banco De Sabadell Spain 0.08* 0.09* 0.09* 0.09    0.10  0.12  0.16  0.24  
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Table 5. Testing Cointegration with Regime Shifts 
Panel A shows an example of test for cointegration of two variables, Greek Sov and Alpha Bank. Panel B shows the exact dates of 
the significant breakpoints obtained from the level shift (C) and regime shift (C/S) models. For each country (except for Greece 
with one financial institution), we show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial institutions by total assets. 
These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), Unicredit and Banca 
Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal) and Banco Santander and Banco De 
Sabadell (Spain). See Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other financial institutions in these countries. The test 
statistics with 
*
 and 
**
 indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The breakpoints show the positions of the 
smallest test statistics in the whole time period, and the exact dates are shown if the estimates are significant.  
Level shift (C): ttSovttFi ecdscds 

,21,                         
Regime shift (C/S): tttSovtSovttFi ecdscdscds 

  ,2,121,  
Panel A. Testing cointegration of Greece and Alpha Bank with regime shifts 
 
 
Test stat. Breakpoint Date 
ADF 
Level shift -4.06 (0.27) 
 
Regime shift -4.85
*
 (0.85) 21-09-2011 
Zt 
Level shift -3.8 (0.85) 
 
Regime shift -5.55
**
 (0.37) 12-05-2010 
Za 
Level shift -28.65 (0.85) 
 
Regime shift -60.6
**
 (0.37) 12-05-2010 
 
Panel B. Estimated breakpoints for the GIIPS countries 
     Variables Level shift (C) Regime shift(C/T) Actual EFSF bailout date 
Greece Alpha Bank 12-05-2010 21-09-2011 09-05-2010 (G1) / 21-07-2011 (G2) 
Ireland Bank of Ireland 25-11-2010 29-12-2010 25-01-2011 (I) 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks 09-12-2010 09-12-2010 25-01-2011 (I) 
Italy Unicredit 27-12-2010 11-01-2011 - 
Italy Banca Popolare Di Milano 11-01-2011 24-01-2011 - 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 21-12-2009 21-12-2009 15-06-2011 (P) 
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 11-12-2009 04-01-2010 15-06-2011 (P) 
Spain Banco Santander 21-01-2010 12-01-2011 - 
Spain Banco De Sabadell 06-11-2009 06-11-2009 - 
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Table 6. Cointegration Analysis of GIIPS Countries and Germany 
The table shows the results from the following cointegration model: 
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The table only presents the cointegration analysis for the bi-variables that are tested to be cointegrated in the Johansen’s trace tests. 
The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10% level. Sov indicates a sovereign debt, and Fi indicates a financial 
institution from the country. β_Sov is set as 1. β coefficients measure the long-run relationships between the two variables, and the 
α coefficients are adjustment speeds of the two variables towards their long-term relationships. For each country (except for 
Greece with one financial institution), we show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial institutions by total 
assets. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks (Ireland), Unicredit and Banca 
Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal), Banco Santander and Banco De 
Sabadell (Spain) and Deutsche Bank and Hannover Re (Germany). See Supplementary Documents for the detailed results of other 
financial institutions in these countries. 
 
Panel A. Before first Greek bailout 
Sovereign Financial Institution α_Sov α_Fi β_Fi Constant 
Greece Alpha Bank 0.00  0.02* -0.83* -0.24  
Ireland Bank of Ireland 0.00  0.01* -3.30* 13.81  
Ireland Allied Irish Banks - - - - 
Italy Unicredit - - - - 
Italy Banca Popolare Di Milano 0.00* 0.00* -21.98* 96.60  
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.00  0.02* -1.41* 2.45  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.00  0.01* -1.56* 3.47  
Spain Banco Santander - - - - 
Spain Banco De Sabadell -0.00* 0.00  3.59* -24.48  
Germany Deutsche Bank 0.00  0.01* -3.94* 14.99  
Germany Hannover Re 0.00  0.00* -13.22* 53.22  
 
Panel B. After first Greek bailout 
Sovereign Financial Institution α_Sov α_Fi β_Fi Constant 
Greece Alpha Bank -0.01  0.01* -2.08* 7.13  
Ireland Bank of Ireland - - - - 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks 0.01  0.02* -1.30* 2.83  
Italy Unicredit -0.01  0.01  -0.92* -0.50  
Italy Banca Popolare Di Milano -0.03* -0.01  -0.68* -1.83  
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.00  0.02* -1.05* 0.63  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.01* 0.01* -1.99* 6.84  
Spain Banco Santander - - - - 
Spain Banco De Sabadell -0.03  0.03* -0.61* -1.98  
Germany Deutsche Bank 0.00  0.02* -1.50* 3.26  
Germany Hannover Re 0.00  0.00* -30.31* 139.55  
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Table 7. Impulse Responses before and after the First Greek Bailout 
The table shows the impulse responses from the model: t
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. For each country (except for Greece with one financial institution), we 
show as examples the results of the largest and the smallest financial institutions by total assets. These financial institutions are Alpha Bank (Greece), Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks 
(Ireland), Unicredit and Banca Popolare De Milano (Italy), Banco Comercial Portugues and Banco Espirito Santo (Portugal), Banco Santander and Banco De Sabadell (Spain) and Deutsche 
Bank and Hannover Re (Germany). A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) increase in the level of the impulse variable. t=1, 2, 5, and 22 indicate the lags of 
variables in each IRF. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10% level. The IRF results of bi-variables not cointegrated are also presented for comparisons. 
Impulse Response 
Before Bailout   After Bailout 
t=1 t=2 t=5 t=22   t=1 t=2 t=5 t=22 
Greece Alpha Bank 0.09  0.13  0.18* 0.39*   0.08* 0.07* 0.10* 0.19* 
Alpha Bank Greece 0.01  0.01  0.02  0.06    -0.21* -0.13  -0.06  0.29  
Ireland Bank of Ireland 0.05* 0.06* 0.08* 0.17*   0.28* 0.32* 0.46* 0.82* 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 0.14* 0.14* 0.12* -0.05    0.03  0.03  0.04  0.06  
Ireland Allied Irish Banks -0.04  -0.07  -0.06  0.12    0.01  0.12  0.17  0.40* 
Allied Irish Banks Ireland 0.16* 0.19* 0.26* -0.15    0.06  0.05  0.19  0.02  
Italy Unicredit -0.05  -0.04  0.03  0.31*   0.21* 0.33* 0.34* 0.38  
Unicredit Italy 0.18* 0.13* 0.11* -0.04    -0.07  -0.13  -0.09  0.12  
Italy Banca Popolare Di Milano 0.07* 0.07* 0.09* 0.15*   0.23* 0.39* 0.30* 0.07  
Banca Popolare Di Milano Italy 0.20* 0.19* 0.15* -0.05    -0.01  -0.10  -0.02  0.31* 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.24* 0.32* 0.38* 0.52*   0.24* 0.35* 0.32* 0.45* 
Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal 0.11* 0.14* 0.11  -0.09    0.06  -0.07  -0.02  0.01  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.22* 0.30* 0.36* 0.48*   0.20* 0.25* 0.19* 0.34* 
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal 0.10* 0.11* 0.07  -0.18    0.11  0.00  -0.12  -0.39  
Spain Banco Santander 0.16* 0.16* 0.19* 0.23*   0.25* 0.42* 0.34* 0.55* 
Banco Santander Spain 0.18* 0.16* 0.11* -0.09    0.13* 0.00  -0.07  -0.07  
Spain Banco De Sabadell 0.09* 0.10* 0.11* 0.18*   0.15* 0.23* 0.34* 0.46* 
Banco De Sabadell Spain 0.17* 0.16* 0.12* -0.08    0.06  0.00  -0.11  0.14  
Germany Deutsche Bank 0.08* 0.11* 0.14* 0.20*   0.06  0.09  0.14* 0.31* 
Deutsche Bank Germany 0.07* 0.09* 0.07  -0.02    0.06  0.06  0.06  0.00  
Germany Hannover Re 0.06  0.01  -0.01  0.03    0.00  0.04  -0.15  -0.10  
Hannover Re Germany 0.03  0.02  0.00  -0.10    0.18* 0.14  0.01  0.03  
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Table 8. Impulse Responses of Greece for the First and Second Greek Bailouts 
A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) increase in the level of the impulse variable. t=1, 2, 5, 
and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10% level. The IRF results of 
bi-variables not cointegrated are also presented for comparisons. 
Impulse Response t=1 t=2 t=5 t=22 
Panel A. Whole period 
Greece Alpha Bank 0.09* 0.07* 0.07* 0.07* 
Alpha Bank Greece -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.06 
Panel B. First Greek bailout 
Before bailout (19/11/2009-07/05/2010) 
Greece Alpha Bank 0.06* 0.12* 0.24* 0.50* 
Alpha Bank Greece 0.10 0.19 0.40 0.82 
Bailout period (10/05/2010-20/07/2011) 
Greece Alpha Bank 0.19* 0.18* 0.27* 0.54* 
Alpha Bank Greece -0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.42 
Panel C. Second Greek bailout 
Application period (21/07/2011-20/02/2012) 
Greece Alpha Bank 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Alpha Bank Greece -0.59* -0.15 -0.10 0.38 
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Table 9. Impulse Responses of Ireland for the Irish Bailout 
A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) increase in the level of the impulse variable. t=1, 2, 5, 
and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10% level. The IRF results of 
bi-variables not cointegrated are also presented for comparisons. 
Impulse Response t=1 t=2 t=5 t=22 
Panel A. Whole period 
Ireland Bank of Ireland 0.19* 0.22* 0.33* 0.74* 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks 0.01* 0.03* 0.07* 0.28* 
Allied Irish Banks Ireland -0.01* -0.02* -0.05* -0.18 
Panel B. Irish Bailout 
Before application (19/11/2009-19/11/2010) 
Ireland Bank of Ireland 0.09* 0.17* 0.38* 0.94* 
Bank of Ireland Ireland -0.05 -0.09 -0.21 -0.51 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks 0.07* 0.14* 0.33* 0.97* 
Allied Irish Banks Ireland -0.03 -0.06 -0.13 -0.38 
Application period (22/11/2010-24/01/2011) 
Ireland Bank of Ireland 0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  
Bank of Ireland Ireland 0.04  0.06  0.08  0.01  
Ireland Allied Irish Banks -0.37* -0.60* -0.85* -0.34  
Allied Irish Banks Ireland 0.05* 0.09* 0.12* 0.05  
Bailout period (25/01/2011-01/04/2012) 
Ireland Bank of Ireland -0.30  -0.47  -0.53  -0.01  
Bank of Ireland Ireland 0.08  0.12* 0.13* 0.00  
Ireland Allied Irish Banks -0.41* -0.76* -1.46* -1.84  
Allied Irish Banks Ireland -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  
After bailout (04/04/2012-08/10/2012) 
Ireland Bank of Ireland 0.28* 0.32* 0.42* 0.76* 
Bank of Ireland Ireland 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  
Allied Irish Banks Ireland 0.27  0.14  0.03  -0.09  
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Table 10. Impulse Responses of Portugal for the Portugal Bailout 
A unit shock in the structural error leads to one standard deviation (in %) increase in the level of the impulse variable. t=1, 2, 5, 
and 22 indicate the lags of variables in each IRF. The test statistics with * indicate significant at the 10% level. The IRF results of 
bi-variables not cointegrated are also presented for comparisons. 
Impulse Response t=1 t=2 t=5 t=22 
Panel A. Whole period 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.20* 0.27* 0.33* 0.50* 
Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.20* 0.30* 0.26* 0.38* 
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal -0.07  -0.06  -0.10  -0.31  
Panel B. Portugal bailout 
Before application (19/11/2009-06/04/2011) 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.26* 0.38* 0.51* 0.74* 
Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal -0.17  -0.20  -0.13  0.09  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.23* 0.32* 0.43* 0.67* 
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal -0.17 -0.21 -0.19 -0.06 
Application period (07/04/2011-14/06/2011) 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.07  0.13  0.25  0.30  
Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal 0.08  0.14  0.27  0.33  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.15  0.25  0.40  0.30  
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal 0.05  0.09  0.14  0.10  
Bailout period (15/06/2011-17/07/2012) 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal 0.01  0.02  0.04  0.10  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.13* 0.15* 0.10  -0.08  
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal 0.05  0.06  0.03  -0.07  
After bailout (18/07/2012-08/10/2012) 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 0.12* 0.22* 0.45* 0.76* 
Banco Comercial Portugues Portugal -0.07 -0.13 -0.28 -0.47 
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 0.10* 0.19* 0.40* 0.72* 
Banco Espirito Santo Portugal -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.15 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Cointegration Tests before and after the First Greek Bailout 
This table shows the results from the Johansen tests statistics. The respective null hypothesis is that the maximum cointegrating 
rank is 0 or 1. The optimal lag length is shown. 
Panel A. Before first Greek bailout 
Variables Lags r=0 r=1 
      trace stat. trace stat. 
Greece Alpha Bank 2 6.82  1.00  
Ireland Bank of Ireland 2 14.42  4.05  
Ireland Allied Irish Banks 9 29.73  4.50  
Italy Unicredit 3 26.23  6.21  
Italy Banca Popolare Di Milano 2 13.69  5.50  
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 2 12.22  2.31  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 2 11.82  3.11  
Spain Banco Santander 2 19.43  7.71  
Spain Banco De Sabadell 2 13.86  5.86  
Germany Deutsche Bank 2 15.03  2.84  
Germany Hannover Re 3 10.64  2.72  
 
Panel B. After first Greek bailout 
Variables Lags r=0 r=1 
      trace stat. trace stat. 
Greece Alpha Bank 2 6.66  0.21  
Ireland Bank of Ireland 2 20.90  6.61  
Ireland Allied Irish Banks 8 14.59  5.17  
Italy Unicredit 3 7.93  1.56  
Italy Banca Popolare Di Milano 3 8.99  1.12  
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 4 7.67  2.10  
Portugal Banco Espirito Santo 4 8.19  1.54  
Spain Banco Santander 4 18.68  5.33  
Spain Banco De Sabadell 6 12.15  2.31  
Germany Deutsche Bank 2 15.03  2.84  
Germany Hannover Re 3 10.64  2.72  
 
 
